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Last week Ukrainian Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko came back from a visit to the United States.
Aside from the demonstratively warm welcome that had never been given to any head of the Ukrainian
government before, one of principle achievements of the visit was that it occurred at all. The previous
visit, scheduled for mid-March 2000, was, in fact, cancelled. Different sources quoted different reasons
for that.
Some argued that the Ukrainian Prime Minister's visit had to be cancelled because of the charges that
the country's central bank, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) had misused some of the IMF loans,
and a series of publications on the topic in the Financial Times. Yet, later the Ukrainian media reported
that spokesman of the U.S. Department of State James Rubin refuted the information and announced
that the visit had been postponed due to the catastrophe at the Barakova mine and the need for
Yushchenko to be present in Ukraine to participate in the work of a special commission that
investigated the causes of the catastrophe. (Ukraina Moloda, March 18, 2000).
Generally, according to the head of the Ukrainian government, the key objective of the negotiations in
Washington D.C. was holding large-scale consultations at all levels, primarily the Administration, the
State Department and business circles. Meetings in Washington D.C. with President Clinton, Vice
President Gore, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, other high-ranking U.S. officials, and World
Bank president Wolferson resulted in explicit declaration of support for the reform undertaken by the
Yushchenko government, for attitude to Ukraine will depend on the tempo of implementing the
economic reform only. This declaration has confirmed the substantial credit of trust the American
political leadership has in Yushchenko and his team. It has also reflected the kind of support it is
prepared to render.
According to Victor Yushchenko, nowadays Ukraine needs not as much financial assistance as political
support of the international community, the United States included. It is critical to prove to the
international community that Ukraine is willing and determined to stay on the track of democracy and
reform, the Prime Minister argues (Demokratychna Ukraina, May 11, 2000). As headlines of some
Ukrainian newspapers put it, political or moral support is more important than money . What else could
be said if the long-sought-after loan was not given again? The U.S. leadership gave Victor Yushchenko
a remarkably warn welcome, but remained firm in its intention to let Ukraine know that there would be
no loans given with Yushchenko's image alone as the collateral. Immediately, a serious blow was dealt
to Victor Yushchenko's informal inner ranking at the Bankova Street, the seat of the President and his
Administration. During Yushchenko's visit it was made clear that chances for provision of IMF and
World Bank loans are directly linked to concrete and noticeable political decisions (not of the Prime
Minister alone, and not as much of the Prime Minister's reformer image), namely privatization, reform
of the energy sector and agriculture (Den, April 11, 2000). The final answer to the question when (and
if at all) the EFF program for Ukraine will be resumed will depend on the second stage of the NBU
audit. Commenting on the issue, Victor Yushchenko announced that an agreement had been achieved
for the IMF mission to come to Kyiv in early June, and the IMF Board of Directors would make its
decision after having all questions settled. Presently it is hard to say when that after is likely to occur.
Some estimate that it may happen after the end of the summer vacation period, while others are more
pessimistic and predict that the funding is unlikely to resume before the elections in the U.S. A Experts
believe that the lack of definite terms for resuming the EFF program is linked both to the pre-election
situation in the U.S. and the likelihood that the NBU, indeed, was engaged in some operations that
were not approved by the IMF.
However, the situation has at least one positive aspect: as described by Taras Stetskiv of the Reforms
and Order party that has offered political support for Yushchenko for years, Victor Yushchenko was
expected to be a person that would only be Ukraine's label to show to the West. Yet, he happened to be
the first [official] to fail to solve the problem of western loans... Therefore, according to Stetskiv, there
is only one way out: to re-orient and become a reformer in his own country, i.e., to implement real
reforms.
Meanwhile, the post-visit situation appears to be developing along the notorious cult line: the West will
help us . Sooner or later. Though, the conditions remain unchanged: political and financial support is
possible only provided Ukraine consistently pursues real economic reform. In any case, much in this
situation depends on Victor Yushchenko himself, on readiness of members of his Cabinet to show
commitment to reform and professionalism, on adequate actions of Ukraine's executive branch as a
whole. The outcome will largely depend on specific steps made by the government, on its readiness to
provide Verkhovna Rada with well-drafted bills that are necessary to ensure implementation of the
reform course as seen by the Yushchenko government. For, as Victor Yushchenko said five months
ago, we have little time for resolute action - virtually several months (Den, December 23, 1999).
A specific quality of time is that it passes so fast. Not so long ago, on December 22, 1999, when the
nomination of Victor Yushchenko for the position of the Prime Minister of Ukraine was approved by
the parliament, the would-be head of the government said in his address to MPs that his principle plans
include the one hundred days program (i.e., the period of making political decisions), and the one
thousand days program (i.e., the period of implementing key reforms). He pledged to focus on
structural transformations, on creating adequate conditions for economic activity, organizing the
national budget spending and filling the budget with real money , reducing the taxation pressure, and
improving management of the state-owned share of the economy. The government's one hundred days
were marked by submitting its program of action, Reforms for Well-being to the parliament, on March
13, 2000. The draft program was criticized by many for being unspecific and too declarative, for the
lack of mechanisms for reforms expected to result in well-being . The program was followed with a
document Measures to Ensure Implementation of the Program of Action of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine . Too many of the proposed measures were not meant for market development, but required
substantial funding to be implemented. Moreover, no specific time framework for implementing the
measures was given.
To date the government has accomplished a number of positive things. The government's program of
action was approved by the parliament on April 6, 2000; the zero-deficit budget for 2000 was adopted
in February 2000; Ukraine's substantial foreign debt was successfully restructured; the massive
administrative reform has begun. However, that is not enough to reform Ukraine's economy effectively,
to create favorable conditions for development of production, equal and transparent conditions for
privatization and other necessary changes.
The general condition that may describe the government's activity in the field of speeding-up economic
transformation so far has been the condition of indefiniteness. Notwithstanding the optimistic reports
about substantial steady growth in industrial production by 10.4 percent in January-April 2000
compared to January-April 1999 - the industrial output increased by 5.3 percent in January 2000 and by
10.2 percent in January-February 2000 (Molod Ukrainy, May 11, 2000), with all respect for the
Yushchenko government it is difficult to attribute the growth to any specific steps the government has
made consciously and systematically to improve the ailing economy's performance. The same can be
said about other branches of power as well: the question about their contributions to the process of
facilitating economic recovery remains open. Another logical question is what exactly prevents the
Ukrainian government from implementing the radical reform today.
There are different answers to this rhetoric question: from the growth problem of Ukrainian
government officials to the economic burden of mistakes of all previous governments. Yet, there is one
relatively recent theme that has been widespread in Ukrainians' mass consciousness and the Ukrainian
media. Lately, the theme has gained the features of an axiom that cannot be contested. Those who
object or dare to point out to slow and sometimes inadequate concrete steps made by the government in
general or its individual structures or officials in particular face the risk to be classed among agents of
the ones who prevent the Yushchenko government from pursuing the reforms effectively, those who try
to make the Yushchenko government sink . The government's rivals of today are oligarchs who, as a
newspaper edited by Victor Yushchenko's old friend and ally put it, without being a branch of power,
enter, like worms, into the very core of the power, pick their fruit in noisy lobbies and the silence of
high offices (Ukraina Moloda, May 6, 2000). So, one of key problems of Ukraine being identified, the
government looks impeccable and deserving sympathy.
The oligarchic theme is not a new one: it was broadly discussed when the nomination of Yushchenko
was expected to be approved by the parliament. Today it is being furnished with a new emphasis.
Voting for Yushchenko in December 1999, a number of MPs motivated their decision by the fact that
he had no connections to oligarchs and clans . For instance, Sergiy Peresunko, MP, called on his
colleagues to support Yushchenko as a person who was now linked to oligarchic clans . Leader of
Socialists Oleksandr Moroz argued that the choice was between prolonging the power of clans and a
liberal development of this state. The latter was the way proposed by Yushchenko, so the Socialist
faction was prepared to back him, said Moroz (Holos Ukrainy, December 23, 1999). Therefore, from
the very beginning the government was seen as a welcome alternative to oligarchic structures . Then
Victor Yushchenko repeatedly stated that the government had to be formed without any involvement of
oligarchs - eventually, speaking of those who were oligarchs at that time but excluding those who had
deserved to be classed among that category before.
Gradually the statement that oligarchs are the force that blocks all positive economic changes in this
country and especially the government's reform efforts has developed into a convenient form of
response to critical remarks about the progress (or the lack of it) in specific fields. Even the problem
with resuming the EFF program has been reported by some Ukrainian politicians to occur due to the
fact that many of the oligarchs are not comfortable with the Yushchenko government, and they act
against him, including in the international arena (Den, May 11, 2000).
Can these arguments be accepted as an axiom? What are pieces of evidence and specific examples of
the government's pro-reform economic initiatives blocked by oligarchs ? Who of Ukraine's influential
power brokers are meant in every specific case? What the reformer government can and must do to
counter the oligarchs' efforts? After announcing that the reforms are blocked by oligarchs , what next
steps must the government make? Today these questions remain rhetoric ones.
The public claim that all problems have been caused by oligarchs contains yet another hazard: such
claims effectively shield the government's own inadequate economic steps. Currently nothing is being
explicitly and officially said about what exactly of the government's actions are blocked by the
oligarchs and how exactly the oligarchs do that. Hence, there is a danger that the economic reform
drive will be buried under the declarations of the need to counter oligarchs ; the government may
simply have neither time nor force for the economic reform.
It has become stylish to comment on oligarchs in Ukraine in general and in the fuel and energy
complex in particular, and explain the country's problems by their conspiracy . Apparently, all
Ukrainian oligarchs focus on the fuel and energy sector: there are practically no talks about oligarchs in
industrial production, in the agrarian sector, the national transportation system, banks and other
similarly important fields. Yet, the experience suggests that the argument that he who controls the
energy sources controls the situation works only on condition of guaranteed lack of competitors.
The problem of oligarchs that hinder the government's efforts appears to be just the top of the huge
iceberg of the government's routine in the context of economic reform. Oligarchs , as monopolists who
have unjustified benefits, obviously, have to be countered in a number of sectors of Ukraine's economy.
However, the methods of countering them should be based on reforming the current system of
economic relations, on transparency, repeatedly pledged by the government, on creation of equal
conditions for all. The government's program of action specified negative consequences of lack of
determination and consistency in the pursuit of reform as the lack of fair competition, substantial level
of monopolization in a number of branches, the permissive policies , the reduction of free enterprise
due to excessive and discriminatory state regulation, heavy taxation burden. So far none of these
factors has been eliminated. If there is a risk that all of the government's actions are reduced to pro-
market rhetoric and complaints about the need to counter plots of oligarchs , the problems of Ukrainian
economy will not be cured.
The answer to the logical question What is to be done? is old to the verge of banality: Ukraine has
finally start making effective steps towards the policy and market reform. This is the task not only for
the government. Otherwise all talks about Ukraine's pro-reform course and unique chances may remain
just talks. The unique chance , as Victor Yushchenko has described the outcome of his visit to
Washington D.C., still exists, but it must be used promptly and skillfully.
